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Bayesian Belief Networks have been largely overlooked by Expert Systems practitioners on the 
grounds that they do not correspond to the human inference mechanism. In this paper, we introduce an 
explanation mechanism designed to generate inruitive yet probabilistically sound explanations of infer­
ences drawn by a Bayesian Belief Network. In particular, our mechanism accounts for the results 
obtained due to changes in the causal and the evidential support of a node. 
1. Introduction 
Probability theory or, more accurately, Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs), is theoretically the soundest 
fonnalism for handling uncertainty (Pearl 1986). However, Expert Systems practitioners have largely 
ignored Bayes Rule on the grounds that it does not correspond to the human inference mechanism 
(Kalmeman and Tversky 1982, Hink and Woods 1987), and have devised new calculi intended to 
resemble more closely this mechanism (Cohen 1985, Gordon and Shortliffe 1985, Shortliffe 1976). 
These calculi, however, have been shown to have some undesirable properties (Adams 1976, 
Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984, Zadeh 1984). 
The mechanism presented in this paper seeks to bridge the gap between probabilistic inference and the 
human interpretation of uncertainty, by generating intuitively appealing and yet probabilistically sound 
explanations. This approach has been adopted by other resean::hers (Reggia and Penicone 1985, Nor­
ton 1986, Elsaesser 1987, Langlotz, Shortliffe and Fagan 1987). Elsaesser has implemented a system 
that accounts for special cases that arise in uncertain reasoning. Norton's system is more general, but 
provides only partial justifications for the obtained results, and Langlotz et al. focus on generating 
explanations of inferences drawn by decision trees. 
A given process or line of reasoning may be explained at different levels of abstraction. The selection 
of an appropriate level depends on a listener's ability and on the complexity of the process under con­
sideration (Paris 1987). In order to follow the thread of reasoning expressed by a BBN, we consider 
two basic levels of abstraction: (1) Macro and (2) Micro. 
i. The Macro level follows the main lines of reasoning leading to a conclusion, without entering 
into extensive detail. It explains qualitatively the reasoning over an entire network or over a path 
in the network. 
ii. The Micro level presents a detailed account of the transition from one set of beliefs to another in 
a particular node. It is generated in circumstances in which a high level explanation may be insuf­
ficient. This happens in particular when the results obtained at this level don't match human 
intuition. 
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b I b 2 bJ 
a, 0.4 0.5 0.1 
a2 0.3 0.5 0.2 
aJ 0.2 0.1 0.7 
B 
C 1 
b, 0.95 
b2 0.9 
b3 0.01 
At l 0 (c 1 and d 1 are not grounded): 
1t(b1) = 0.30, rc(b"J} = 0.38, rc(b3) = 0.32 
A.(b1) = 1.0, J...(biJ = 1.0, A.(b3) = LO 
1t 
a, 0.3 
a20.4 
a3 0.3 
Bel(b1) = 0.30, Bel(biJ = 0.38 , Bel(b3) = 0.32 
At 11 (c 1 is grounded): 
Bel(a1) = 0.3955, Bel(aiJ = 0.4678, Bel(a3) = 0.1367 
1t(b1) = 0.30, rc(b"J} = 0.38, 1t(b3) = 0.32 
A.(bd = 0.95, 'J...(biJ = 0.9, /...(b3) = 0.01 
Bel(b1) = 0.4522, Bel(bi) = 0.5427, Bel(b3) = 0.0051 
At t2 (d 1 is grounded): 
Bel (a 1) = 0.455, Bel (aiJ = 0.505, Bel (a3) = 0.04 
rc(b1) = 0.33, rt(biJ = 0.46, rc(b3) = 0.21 
/...(bt) = 0.95, 'J...(biJ = 0.9, /...(bJ) = 0.01 
Bel(b1) = 0.429, Bel(biJ = 0.568, Bel(b3) = 0.003 
Fig. 1: Sample Bayesian Belief Network 
d, 
a, 0.1 
a2 0.09375 
a 3 0.025 
The Micro Explanations accounted for by the mechanism presented in this paper focus on a hypothesis 
of interest in a given node, denmed focal hypothesis. The belief in a focal hypothesis b1• e.g., b 1 in 
figure 1, is given by the following formula (Pearl 1986): 
Belief (b1) = oJ.(bf '!rt(bt) 
where A. represents evidential support, and 1t - causal support 
(1) 
One possible strategy for the explanation of Bel (b1) considers only the current values of rc and A., 
yielding explanations such as • 'We have substantial belief in b1 because it has substantial causal sup­
port and high evidential support." This strategy may be suitable for situations where the item of 
interest is the absolute value of a belief in a hypothesis, without taking into consideration the previous 
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value of this belief, or the values of beliefs in competing hypotheses. However, the explanations pro­
duced by this strategy leave something to be desired, since it is more often the case that the item of 
interest is the value of a belief resulting from changes in the network, relative to its previous value 
and to competing beliefs. 
As is evident from Eq. (1), a change in the belief in a proposition may be caused by a change in its 
causal support, lt, or its evidential support, l. Therefore, it is convenient to view a Micro Explanation 
as having three basic components: (1) Explanation of a change in causal support, (2) Explanation of a 
change in evidential support, and (3) Explanation of the result obtained by merging these two meas­
ures of belief. 
In this paper, we focus on a mechanism for the generation of the last of these components. We present 
a strategy for the generation of explanations for special cases, such as binary nodes and nodes with 
three hypotheses, and examine how this strategy extends to multi-valued nodes. Strategies for the gen­
eration of the other components appear in [Sember and Zukennan 1989a]. 
2. Mathematical Basis of an Explanation 
Using Eq. (I) we can show that if the evidential support for a node remains fixed but the causal sup­
port changes, then the direction of a change in Bel (b1) is given by: 
where: 
II 
= "f).(b;)U;.t 
i:::l 
If U > 0 then Bel (bf) increases. 
If U < 0 then Bel (bt) decreases. 
If U "" 0  then Bel(bt} does TWt change. 
(2) 
Similarly, if the causal support remains fixed but the evidential support changes, from Eq. (1) we 
obtain: 
where: 
II 
i=l 
If D > 0 then Bel (bf) increases. 
If D < 0 then Bel (bf) decreases. 
If D = 0 then Bel(b1) does TWt change. 
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(3) 
U; 1 describes the effect on Bel (b1) of a change in the causal support of b; and b1, assuming that b; is 
the only competitor of b1. D1.t is identical, except that it is concerned with evidential support t. From 
Eq. (2) we can arrive at the following properties of lh.t: 
If U;1 == 0 then the interaction between b; and b1 has no effect on Bel (b1 ). 
If U;1 > 0 then the interaction between b1 and b1 has an upward effect on Bel(bf ). 
If u, J < 0 then the interaction between b; and bt has a downward effect on Bel (bf ). 
Replacing this formulation of U11 with the corresponding factor in Eq. (2) yields results consistent 
with human intuition. For example, U;1 < 0 under the following conditions: 
CJ /!,.1t(bt) < 0 and /!,.1t(b1) > 0 
/!,.1t(b,) 61t(b;) 
C2 !J:rr.(bt) > 0 and 61t(b;) > 0, where -(b ) xlOO% < -( -.)-xlOO% 
1t f t. 1t b, l1 
ltm(b )I IM(b;)l 
C3 Mc(b1) < 0 and 61t(b;) < 0, where ( '! xiOO% > (b ) xlOO% 1t b f),, 7t i h 
CJ represents a situation where the causal support for hJ decreases and the causal support for a com­
peting hypothesis increases, causing the interaction between these hypotheses to have a downward 
effect on Bel(b1 ). In C2, the causal support for both hypotheses increases. however the percent-wise 
increase for b1 is less than for its competitor. C3 is similar to C2 but with a decrease in causal support 
taking place, and the percent-wise decrease in the support for b1 being larger than forb;. The condi­
tions under which the interaction between b; and b1 has an upward effect or no effect on Bel (b1) take 
a similar form. 
3. Generating Explanations 
For an explanation to be convincing, a user's expectations have to be addressed, in particular if they 
are violated by the results obtained by a system. Failure to do so may cause the user to experience 
negative affective responses, which in tum may foster unwillingness to accept a system's fmdings 
(Zukerman and Pearl 1986). To cater for this requirement, the procedure for generating an explanation 
for a change in Bel (b1) performs the following actions; 
1. Identify an expectation. 
2. If the expectation is met, then generate a basic explanation. Otherwise, generate an explanation 
based on identifying the cause of the expectation violation. 
This procedure is applied both for justifying a change in Bel (bt) caused by a change in the 7t(&. )-s 
with lhe A(b; )-s fixed, and for explaining a change in Bel (b1) due to a change in the i..(b; )-s wirh the 
1t(b; )-s fixed. The application of this procedure in the latter case requires that the A.-s be nonnalized. 
The discussion in the rest of this paper focuses on the former case. 
The following table characterizes likely user expectations for Mel (bj) in terms of changes in 1t. 
t The results obtained for D;1 correspond to those obtained for U;1, and will not be discussed here. 
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El If 1t(b1) increases then the reader expects Bel (b1) to increase. 
E2 If 1t(b1) decreases then the reader expects Bel (b1) to decrease. 
E3 If 1t(b1) doesn' 1 change then the reader expects Bel (b1) nor to change. 
3.1 Expectation Met - Generating a Basic Explanation 
An expectation is met in the following cases: (1) A binary node, (2) All the competing hypotheses 
have equal evidential support, and (3) The causal support for each of the competing hypotheses either 
remains unchanged or is changed in a direction opposite to the change in the support of the focal 
hypothesis, e.g., if the causal support for the focal hypothesis increases, the causal support for the 
remaining hypotheses either decreases or remains unchanged. In these cases, the premise of the condi­
tional statement corresponding to the met expectation forms the basis of an explanation, and it is 
unnecessary to go into further details regarding the interaction between the different hypotheses. For 
example, the explanation we would generate for Mel (b1) when expectation El holds would take the 
form: 
The belief in b1 has increased due to an increase in its causal support. 
3.2 Expectation Not Met - Justifying an Expectation Violation 
When solving problems, people take advantage of domain knowledge in order to apply the strongest 
procedure which accomplishes a desired goal (Nilsson 1980). This approach is also taken in Natural 
Language Processing, where people try to use the most specific terms and phrases which reflect their 
ideas (Zernik 1987). We follow this paradigm by identifying specific cases which may be better 
explained by "tailored explanations." 
Let us consider a node with three hypotheses. From Eq. (2) it follows that if an expectation with 
respect to the focal hypothesis is not met, the evidential support for the hypothesis which agrees with 
the expectation must be lower than the evidential support for the hypothesis which contradicts it 
(Sember and Zukerman 1989b). We distinguish between two cases which account for competent 
explanations, depending on the relative strength of the evidential support for the hypothesis which 
agrees with the expectation. 
Case 1: The evidential support for this hypothesis does not affect significantly the contradictory result. 
Hence, it may be discarded, effectively resulting in the node in question becoming a binary node; 
and 
Case 2: The evidential support for this hypothesis significantly reduces the effect of the contradicting 
hypothesis. 
Let us now consider an explanation which may be generated for an extreme instance of the first case. 
In figure I, we see that the belief in b1 is altered as its causal support changes due to the grounding of 
d1• The justification for this change is: 
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The causal support for b1 increased by 10%, and the support for b2 increased by over 20%. Now, 
since there is overwhelming evidence against b3, b2 and b 1 remain the only two alternatives, 
thus they compete against each other. As a result, the overall belief in b1 must decrease.t 
We can obtain an example of the second case by changing the values of the A.-s at t1 and t2 to 
A.(bt)"' 0.2268, A.(b2} = 0.7524 and A.(b3) "'0.2225, resulting in the set of beliefs at Ito Bel(b1) ==0.16, 
Bel (b1) = 0.6725 and Bel(b3):: 0.1675, changing to Bel(b1)"" 0.16, Bel(b2) = 0.74 and Bel(b3) = 0.1 at t2. 
The explanation in this case takes the following fonn: 
Since the evidential support for b3 is lower than for b2, let us assume for a moment that the 
evidence rules out b3, thereby bringing b2 into closer competition with b 1• 
If b 3 is ruled out, the fact that the causal support for b2 increases by a larger percentage than 
for b 1 leads to the belief in b 1 being reduced. 
Now, the decrease in the causal support for b3 has the opposite effect on the belief in b1• 
Hence, since the evidence doesn't completely rule out b3, it actually diminishes the effect of 
b2• This explains why the belief in b1 remains fixed. 
This explanation is based on the following actions: 
1. Temporarily eliminate the competing hypothesis b; with the lowest evidential support. This 
hypothesis matches the expectation with respect to b1, i.e., it satisfies the condition 
sign (U; 1) ,.t. sign (Mel (b1 )) . •  
2. Explain the effect of the remaining hypothesis. 
3. Reinstate the eliminated hypothesis, thereby diminishing this effect. 
Note that the second step actually generates an explanation similar to the one presented for Case 1. In 
our example, the true behaviour for Bel(b1), i.e., no change, lies between the reader's expectation and 
the extreme result obtained by ruling out b3• The later part of the explanation, which states how the 
extreme result is moderated by the reinstatement of b3, accounts for this behaviour. 
3.2.1 Expectation Not Met - Generalizing the Explanation Strategy 
The procedure for generating an explanation for a node with an arbitrary number of hypotheses takes 
the following form: 
1. Choose an Elimination Threshold (EI'). 
2. Form two sets of hypotheses: 
In - contains the hypotheses b; for which sign(U,J) = sign(Mel(b1 )) and A.(b;) > ET. These 
hypotheses have relatively high evidential support, and their effect contradicts the expecta­
tion with respect to b1. 
Out - contains the hypotheses b, for which sign (Ui J) � sign (Mel (b1)) and A.( hi) < ET. These 
hypotheses have relatively low evidential support, and they agree with the expectation with 
respect to b1. 
3. If the ET has a low value, then generate an explanation based only on the hypotheses in the In 
t Adapted from an explanation provided by J. Pearl (1988). 
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set. Otherwise, temporarily discard the Out set. generate an explanation based on the In set, and 
then reinstate the Out set. 
This explanation strategy constitutes a generalization of the strategy proposed for a node with three 
hypotheses. It is based on the rationale that in order to justify why an expectation is not met, we must 
show that one or more hypotheses which support the expectation are eliminated due to lack of eviden­
tial support. These are the hypotheses in the set Out. Notice, however, that for explanations generated 
by this strategy to be acceptable, the elimination threshold must be selected so that there are no 
hypotheses b; such that sign(U;1) =:. sign(MJel(b1)) and '"A(b;) < ET, i.e., there are no hypotheses which 
contradict the expectation and whose evidential support lies below the ET. 
The elimination threshold is determined by applying heuristics which take into consideration the evi­
dential support for each of the competitors of bt. A threshold is guaranteed to exist, because it can 
been shown that when the expectation is not met, In and Out contain at least one hypothesis (Sember 
and Zukerman 1989b). In the case where the ET has a low value, the effect of the hypotheses in Out 
on Bel (b1) is negligible, and therefore does not need to be mentioned. As the ET increases, the effect 
of these hypotheses may need to be discussed. 
This strategy supports the generation of an explanation of the following general form for a case where 
the ET is low, and 1t(b1) increases but Bel (b1) decreases. 
The evidence is ruling out the hypotheses in Out, bringing b1 into 
closer competition with the hypotheses in ln. Since the causal suppon 
for the hypotheses in In increases by a greater percentage than that 
of b1, Bel(b1) decreases. 
The explanations generated by this strategy are concocted (Wick and Thompson 1989, Chan­
drasekaran, Tanner and Josephson 1989), in the sense that they address one aspect which "explains 
away'' an observed behaviour, ignoring other events which may have bearing on this behaviour, such 
as the interactions arising from the hypotheses outside the sets In and Out. Still, these explanations 
appear to be satisfactory to users with diverse probabilistic backgrounds. In addition, explanations 
which examine all the hypotheses would be considerably longer than the ones produced by our stra­
tegy, and, hence, would be unsuitable for a network where a number of nodes have to be considered. 
Our explanation strategy must be extensively tested to fine tune the heuristics for choosing the elimi­
nation threshold, and also to ascertain the effect on Bel (b1) of the changes in the causal support for the 
hypotheses outside the sets In and Out. 
4. Conclusion 
The mechanism discussed in this paper accounts for intuitively appealing and yet probabilistically 
sound explanations for BBNs. At present, our mechanism is particularly suited for producing explana­
tions involving a few nodes. In particular, it accounts for the results obtained from a combination of 
the causal and evidential support of a node. Our mechanism is in the initial stages of its implementa­
tion, and work. is progressing on a module which produces frame-based output. 
The next stage of our work. involves the generalization of our mechanism to larger networks. Titis 
requires the development of pruning techniques which take into account both salience considerations 
and user attributes. 
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